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Abstract
The paper discusses community enforcement in innitely repeated, two-action games
with local interaction and uncertain monitoring. Each player interacts with and ob-
serves only a xed set of opponents, of whom he is privately informed. The main
result shows that when beliefs about the monitoring structure have full support, ef-
ciency can be sustained with sequential equilibria that are independent of the play-
ersbeliefs. Stronger results are obtained when only acyclic monitoring structures
are allowed or players have unit discount rates. These equilibria satisfy numerous
robustness properties.
London School of Economics.
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1 Introduction
In many strategic environments, interaction is local and segmented. Competing neighbor-
hood stores by and large serve di¤erent yet overlapping sets of customers, the behavior
of the residents of an apartment block a¤ects their contiguous neighbors to a larger ex-
tent than neighbors in a di¤erent block, a nations foreign or domestic policy typically
generates larger externalities for neighboring nations than for remote ones. One classic
case is the private provision of local public goods in which the strategic interaction is
modelled using either a prisoners dilemma or by a hawk-dove game. For example, many
forms of anti-social behavior are generally captured by the former whereas investments
in common security, infrastructure or maintenance that yield benets only when a xed
cut-o¤ level is reached by the latter. In addition to local interaction, one notable feature
of these environments is uncertain monitoring: whereas participants are aware of their
own neighborsidentities and actions, they are not necessarily aware of the identity and
actions of their neighborsneighbors.
Within these strategic environments, it is of particular interest to study long run in-
teraction, when incentives can only be provided locally in a decentralized manner. Our
objective is to analyze such interaction within a repeated game framework that di¤ers
from the standard one by allowing actions to be observed only locally. Such framework,
despite its plainness and its potential applications, has not yet produced signicant re-
sults in the literature. A natural question that we will address is whether local community
enforcement su¢ ces to generate e¢ cient behavior. The main obstacle to sustaining coop-
eration is that information about individualspast behavior in a relationship is local: it is
common knowledge within the relationship, but is not necessarily available to outsiders.
The absence of publicly observable histories implies that punishment are no longer based
on simultaneouscoordination: by punishing a neighbors deviation, a player can trigger
subsequent punishments from di¤erent neighbors, who were not related to the original
defector and were thus unable to observe the initial deviation. Thus, if a shop ceases to
collude in order to punish defections by a neighboring competitor, it will a¤ect the be-
havior of other neighboring shops that were not a¤ected by the rst defection. Moreover,
as such defections spread through neighborhoods, they might return to one of the players
who was either a source of such defection or had retaliated to it, and enter cycles. Nat-
urally, in these circumstances the construction of equilibrium incentives for cooperative
behavior and the derivation of equilibrium beliefs is a challenging task.
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1.1 Summary
We study innitely repeated two-action games. The setup consists of a nite number
of players who choose in every period whether to cooperate or defect. A graph that
represents the monitoring structure, the information network, is realized at the beginning
of the game. Each player is privately informed of his neighborhood, namely the subset
of players with whom he will interact in bilateral relationships for an innite number of
periods, but receives no information as to other playersneighborhoods. A player observes
only the actions played by his neighbors and, crucially, cannot discriminate among them
by choosing di¤erent actions. That is, in every period a player chooses one action that
applies to all bilateral relationships in his neighborhood. All the players play the same
game in all neighborhoods.
We show that, for su¢ ciently high discount rates and any beliefs with full support
about the monitoring structure, sequential equilibria exist in which the e¢ cient stage-
game outcome is played in every period. It should be noted that standard results do not
apply because bilateral enforcement may not be incentive compatible when punishments
in one relationship a¤ect outcomes in all the others. For instance, punishing a neighbor
indenitely with a grim trigger strategy is not viable if cooperation in other relationships
is disrupted, and modications as in Ellison (1994) work only for particular specications
of payo¤s. Indeed, equilibrium strategies will be such that, after any history, players
believe that cooperation will eventually resume.
Our proofs are constructive, and exploit simple bounded-punishment strategies which
are robust with respect to the playerspriors about the monitoring structure. In partic-
ular, in the equilibria characterized only local information matters to determine players
behavior. E¢ ciency is supported by strategies that respond to defections with further
defections. When the playersdiscount rate is smaller than one, the main di¢ culty in the
construction of sequentially rational strategies that support e¢ ciency is the preservation
of short-run incentive compatibility after some particular histories of play. When defec-
tions spread through a network, two complications arise. The rst occurs when a player
expects future defection coming from a particular direction. Suppose that somewhere in
a cycle, for example, a defection has occurred and reaches a player from one direction. If
this player does not respond, he may expect future defections from the opposite direction
caused by players who are themselves responding to the original defection. This players
short term incentives then depend on the timing and on the number of future defections
that he expects. In such cases, the verication of sequential rationality and the calculation
of consistent beliefs can be extremely demanding. We will circumvent this di¢ culty via
the construction of consistent beliefs such that a player never expects future defections
to reach him. Such beliefs are generated trivially when priors assign positive probability
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only to acyclic monitoring structures. More importantly, as we shall see, such beliefs can
also be generated when priors have full support. The second complication arises when a
player has failed to respond to a large number of defections. On the one hand, matching
the number of defections of the opponent in the future may not be incentive compati-
ble, say when this player is currently achieving e¢ cient payo¤s with a large number of
di¤erent neighbors. The restriction that a players action is common to all neighbors is
of course the main source of complications here. On the other hand, not matching them
may give rise to the circumstances outlined in the rst type of complications, that is, this
player may then expect future defections from a di¤erent direction. The former hurdle
will be circumvented by bounding the length of punishments and the latter, as before, by
constructing appropriate consistent beliefs.
The above di¢ culties do not arise when players are patient as short-term incentives are
irrelevant and punishments need not be bounded. Indeed, stronger results are obtained
for the case of limit discounting in which payo¤s are evaluated according to Banach-Mazur
limits. We will show that e¢ ciency is resilient to histories of defections. In particular,
there exists a sequential equilibrium such that, after any nite sequence of defections,
paths eventually converge to the constant play of e¢ cient actions in all neighborhoods
in every future period. An essential part of the construction is that in any relationship
in which defections have occurred the number of periods in which the ine¢ cient actions
are played is balanced: as the game unfolds from any history, both players will have
played the ine¢ cient action an equal number of times before resuming the e¢ cient play.
Remarkably, such balanced retaliations eventually extinguish themselves and always allow
the resumption of cooperation throughout the network.
Although our formal analysis will be restricted to uniform discount rates and symmet-
ric stage games with deterministic payo¤s, the equilibria characterized are robust with
respect to heterogeneity in payo¤s and discount rates, and with respect to uncertainty
in payo¤s and population size, as long as the ordinal properties of the stage games are
maintained across the players. The above equilibria will obviously persist as babbling
equilibria in setups with communication. In addition, these equilibria can be easily mod-
ied to accommodate monitoring structures in which players interact with fewer players
than they observe.
Section 2 presents the setup and denes the relevant equilibrium properties. Section
3 considers games in which players are arbitrarily patient and proves the existence of
cooperative equilibria. Such equilibria are shown to be independent of the playersbeliefs
on the monitoring structure, and to satisfy a desirable notion of stability and several other
robustness properties. Section 4 considers games with impatient players and shows how
cooperation can be achieved when prior beliefs have full support. The rst part of the
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appendix shows that results trivially extend to games in which only acyclic monitoring
structures are possible. All the proofs omitted from the main text appear in the second
part of the appendix.
1.2 Related Literature
This paper ts within the literature on community enforcement in repeated games. A ma-
jor strand pioneered by Kandori (1992) and Ellison (1994) has focussed on environments
with random matching of players and shown that e¢ cient allocations can be sustained
as equilibria when players become arbitrarily patient. Subsequent contributions include
Takahashi (2008) and Deb (2011). In our model, matching is not random but determined
at the beginning of the game and xed throughout the play.
A large, growing literature investigates community enforcement in environments in
which players interact with and monitor di¤erent subsets of other players under a variety
of di¤erent modelling assumptions. The advantage of our framework is that it does not rely
on neighbor-specic punishments, communication, or knowledge of the global monitoring
structure. Some notable studies allow players to choose neighbor specic actions, such
as Ali and Miller (2008), Lippert and Spagnolo (2008), Mihm, Toth and Lang (2009),
Fainmesser (2010), Jackson et al (2010), Fainmesser and Goldberg (2011), while others
restrict attention to environments in which the monitoring structure is common knowledge
and communication is possible, such as Ahn (1997), Vega-Redondo (2006), and Kinateder
(2008). The vast majority of these studies focuses on prisoners dilemma type interactions.
Our framework is closely related to several works which, unlike our model, postulates
no uncertainty about the monitoring structure. Ben Porath and Kahneman (1996) estab-
lish a sequentially rational Folk Theorem for general stage game payo¤s when each player
is observed by at least two other players, and when public communication and public
randomization are allowed. Renault and Tomala (1998) establish a Nash Folk Theorem
for special monitoring structures (in which the subgraphs obtained by suppressing any
one player are still connected), general stage game payo¤s, no discounting, and no ex-
plicit communication. Haag and Laguno¤ (2006) consider games with prisoners dilemma
interactions and heterogeneous discount rates, and show for which monitoring structures
cooperation can be sustained by local trigger strategies. Xue (2004) and Cho (2010 &
2011) also focus on the prisoners dilemma. Cho (2010) considers acyclical networks and
allows neighbors to communicate. Cho (2011) shows the existence of sequential equilibria
in which players cooperate in every period and in which cooperation eventually resumes
after deviations if public randomization is allowed. Xue (2004) restricts the analysis to
linear networks.
Wolitzky (2012) investigates a setup similar to ours with uncertainty about the moni-
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toring structure, and characterizes the maximal level of cooperation that can be enforced
for xed discount rates in a local public goods game with compact action sets. Unlike our
model, the monitoring structure changes every period and is learned at the end of each
period. This feature of the model plays an essential role in the equilibrium construction,
and prevents any of his results to apply to our framework.
One signicant point of departure of our paper from the above literature is the con-
struction of equilibrium strategies. In particular, reciprocity will play a crucial role in the
characterization of sequentially rational behavior. Our equilibria are somewhat evocative
of the trading favorsequilibria in Möbius (2001) and Hauser and Hopenhayn (2004),
despite the frameworks bearing little resemblance. Notably, our players can be viewed
tradingpunishment o¤ the equilibrium path.
2 Setup And Equilibrium Properties
We rst introduce the setup and the information structure. Then, we proceed to dene
the solution concept and equilibrium properties.
2.1 The Stage Game
Consider a game, the stage game, played by a set N of n players in which any player i
interacts with a subset of players Ni  Nnfig of size ni, which we call the neighborhood
of player i. We assume that j 2 Ni if and only if i 2 Nj. This structure of interaction
denes an undirected graph (N;G) in which ij 2 G if and only if j 2 Ni. We shall refer to
G as the information network. Dene a path to be an m tuple of players (j1; ::; ; jm) such
that jk+1 2 Njk , k = 1; 2:::;m  1. If jm = j1, a path is a cycle. Given a neighborhood Ni
for player i, let   (Ni) be the set of information networks in which player is neighborhood
is Ni.
Players are privately informed about their neighborhood. The beliefs of player i regard-
ing the information network, conditional upon observing his neighborhood, are derived
from common prior beliefs f over the set of information networks.1 We say that a prior
f is admissible if, for any i 2 N and M  Nnfig, f (G) > 0 for some G for which
Ni = M . Admissibility ensures that posterior beliefs are well dened for any realization
of the information network. We assume throughout the paper that priors are admissible.
The set of admissible priors is denoted by A.
The set of actions of player i is Ai and consists of only two actions labeled C and D.
We will refer to action C as cooperation and to action D as defection. A player must
1The assumption that priors are common is inessential.
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choose the same action for all his neighbors. That is, a player cannot discriminate across
neighbors and his action must be played in his entire neighborhood. Given a subset M
of players, let AM denote j2MAj and aM an element of AM . We will often use  i to
denote Nnfig. The payo¤ of any player is separable across relationships. Let ij dene
the emphasis of player i in the relationship with player j. The stage game payo¤ of player
i is
vi(ai; aNi) =
P
j2Ni ijuij(ai; aj)
where uij(ai; aj), the payo¤ of player i in the relationship ij 2 G, is given by
i n j C D
C 1  l
D 1 + g 0
For ease of notation, we assume that ij > 0 for any ij in G. Note that, if ij = 0 for
ij 2 G, player i observes the actions of player j but his payo¤ is not a¤ected. All our
results extend to the case in which some ijs are equal to zero for ij 2 G.
We adopt the convention that payo¤s are equal to zero when Ni is empty. For sim-
plicity, the above payo¤ matrix is common to all bilateral relationships. We will clarify
along the analysis when this assumption can be dispensed with.
We restrict attention to stage games payo¤s for which mutual cooperation is e¢ cient.
We will also assume that defection is a best response when the opponent cooperates to rule
out the trivial case in which mutual cooperation is an equilibrium of the stage game. Such
restrictions amount to the following assumption, which will be maintained throughout.
Assumption A1: g   l < 1, g > 0.
Payo¤s are common knowledge. After the main results, we will discuss the extent to which
this assumption is necessary. Naturally, if l > 0, the stage game has a unique Bayes Nash
equilibrium in which all players play D. If instead l < 0, the stage game always possesses
a mixed strategy Bayes Nash equilibrium.2
2.2 The Repetition
The players play the innite repetition of the stage game. The information network is
realized prior to the beginning of play and remains constant thereafter. In every period,
a player observes only the past play of his neighbors. The set of possible histories for
2When l < 0, pure strategy equilibria also exist in some networks, as choosing actions di¤erent than
their neighborscan be a players best reply. In particular, if beliefs are concentrated on networks with
cycles of even length, pure equilibria exist, since players can successfully mis-coordinate actions with all
their neighbors.
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player i 2 N whose realized neighborhood is Ni is dened as
Hi;Ni = f;g [ f[1t=1
ts=1ANi[figg
where ; denotes the empty history. An interim strategy for player i with neighborhood
Ni is a function i;Ni that assigns to each history in Hi;Ni an action in fC;Dg. The set
of interim strategies of player i is i;Ni . A strategy i of player i is a collection of interim
strategies fi;MgMNnfig.
Players discount the future with a common factor   1. To dene the payo¤s of the
innitely repeated game, x a networkG. Given a prole of strategies N = (1; 2; ::; n),
let fatNg1t=0 be the sequence of stage-game actions generated by N when the information
network is G, and fvi(ati; atNi)g1t=1 be the sequence of stage game utilities of player i.
Dene
wti (N jG) =
Pt
s=1
vi(a
s
i ; a
s
Ni
)
t
to be the average payo¤up to period t and wi (N jG) = fwti (N jG)g1t=1 to be the sequence
of average payo¤s. Repeated game payo¤s conditional on network G are dened as
Vi(N jG) =
(
(1  )P1t=1 t 1vi(ati; atNi) if  < 1
 (wi (N jG)) if  = 1
where  () denotes the Banach-Mazur limit of a sequence. If `1 denotes the set of
bounded sequences of real numbers, a Banach-Mazur limit is a linear functional  : `1 !
R such that: (i) (e) = 1 if e = f1; 1; :::g; (ii) (x1; x2; :::) = (x2; x3; :::) for any sequence
fxtg1t=0 2 `1 (see [4]). It can be shown that, for any sequence fxtg1t=0 2 `1,
lim inft!1 xt  
 fxtg1t=1  lim supt!1 xt
Remark 1 For simplicity, we will restrict players to use pure strategies. Since player
is beliefs assign positive probability to a nite number of paths for any history in Hi;Ni,
linearity ensures that the expectation of the Banach-Mazur limit is the same as the Banach-
Mazur limit of the expectation. Our analysis can be extended to mixed strategies with
innite supports by using special Banach-Mazur limits, called medial limits, which can be
shown to exists under the continuum hypothesis (see [1]).
Dene the set of histories for the entire game to be
H = f;g [ f[1t=1
ts=1ANg
Given a history h 2 H, the realization of an information network G, and a prole of
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strategies N = (1; 2; ::; n), dene the prole hN;G = (
h
1;N1
; h2;N2 ; ::; 
h
n;Nn
) induced
by the history h and information network G in the standard way. A pair (G; h) will be
referred to as a node of the dynamic game.3 A pair (Ni; hi) of a neighborhood and an
observed history (or simply an observed history hi as its components identify the neighbors
of player i) is associated uniquely with information set I (hi) and viceversa.4 With some
abuse of notation, we will sometimes use hi to denote I (hi).
A system of beliefs  denes at each information set I (hi) of player i the conditional
probability  (G; hjhi) of each node (G; h) 2 I (hi). The marginal belief of a network G
is denoted by  (Gjhi) and of a history h by  (hjhi).
2.3 Equilibrium Properties
In this section, we dene three properties of strategies. The rst requires a strategy prole
to be a sequential equilibrium that is invariant with respect to any prior beliefs in a subset
of admissible beliefs.
Denition ( Invariant Equilibrium -IE): A strategy prole is a -invariant
equilibrium,   A, if it is a sequential equilibrium for any prior beliefs in .
As strategies depend on the observed neighborhood, -invariance requires that the play-
ers behavior is not a¤ected by conditional beliefs about remote parts of the network
derived from priors in . Naturally, the scope of this requirement depends on the choice
of possible beliefs. Within the connes of such choice, invariance implies that local re-
sponsiveness su¢ ces for sequential rationality and equilibrium behavior. Relatedly, -
invariance also implies that prior beliefs need not be common, in so far as they belong to
the set . All the equilibrium constructions presented in the paper will satisfy some form
of invariance. We highlight this property in our analysis as it establishes that e¢ cient
behavior need not be ne-tuned to the exact beliefs about the global monitoring structure:
the network structure itself is immaterial in that only local information matters for the
determination of a players incentives.
The second property is straightforward and selects strategies in which every player
cooperates for any information network.
Denition (Collusive C): A strategy prole is collusive if the sequence of stage-game
actions generated for any information network is such that the players play C in every
period.
3Throughout, the term vertex is used to refer to the nodes of the information network, whereas the
term node is used to refer to the nodes of the extensive form game.
4Formally dene I  hi = I   Ni; hi = (G; h) Ni = Ni and hi = hi	 :
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The nal property characterizes the robustness of an equilibrium to occasional defec-
tions by players. This denition is similar to, yet marginally stronger than, the notion of
global stability dened in Kandori (1992).
Denition ( Stability -S): A strategy prole satises -stability,   A, if for
any information network G such that f (G) > 0 for some f 2  and any history h 2 H,
there exists a period T hG such that all the players play C in all periods greater than T
h
G.
We deem equilibria satisfying -stability of interest as cooperation will always resume
after any number of mistakes.
The main results of this paper establish the existence of collusive strategy proles that
are -invariant equilibria for various choices of , with -stability sometimes playing a
role in the equilibrium construction. Several additional robustness properties will be dis-
cussed after each result. Obviously, the main hurdles are brought about by the restriction
that a players action applies to indiscriminately to his entire neighborhood. If players
could choose a di¤erent action for each relationship, standard results would yield a Folk
Theorem.
3 Patient Players
In this section, we show that when short-term incentives are inessential, as the players
payo¤s equal the long-term average, cooperation can be achieved via a simple strategy
prole that satises A-invariance and A-stability. In this prole, cooperation is bal-
anced: as the game unfolds from any history, in each relationship a player will have
defected for the same number of periods as his opponent, before reverting to permanent
cooperation.
This case is obviously of interest in and of itself when long-run payo¤s are the sole
playersmotive in the strategic interaction. More importantly, it brings into focus two
considerations. First, retaliatory punishments that are balanced, although propagating
through the information network, always extinguish themselves in aggregate either by
reaching a player with only one neighbor or by neutralizing themselves when reaching
a player simultaneously from di¤erent directions. Second, such retaliatory behavior can
be made consistent with sequential rationality because of the irrelevance of short-term
incentives. If in each relationship a player will have ultimately defected for the same
number of periods as his opponent, there does not exist a nite bound that applies to all
histories on the number of the defections that a player expects from his opponent. Thus,
there may not be a discount rate su¢ ciently large to neutralize short term incentives after
any history. As we shall see in the next section, when the discount factor is less than
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unity, we induce short-term incentive compatibility by abandoning balanced retaliations
and bounding punishments at the expense of A-stability.
To formulate the equilibrium strategies, rst dene a pair of state variables (dij; dji) 2
N2+ for each relationship ij 2 G. Both state variables depend only on the history of past
play within the relationship and are therefore common knowledge for players i and j.
The number dij represents the number of periods in which player i will have to play D
as a consequence of the past play in relationship ij. The state variablestransitions are
constructed so that (i) unilateral deviations to D are punished with an additional D by
the opponent; (ii) unilateral deviations to C are punished with an additional D both by
the player and by his opponent; (iii) joint deviations to the same action are not punished
whereas joint deviations to di¤erent actions are punished as unilateral deviations. Thus,
the transition rule for (dij; dji) is dened as follows. In the rst period, dij = 0 for any
ij 2 G. Thereafter, for any history h 2 H leading to state (dij; dji) in the relationship ij,
if actions (ai; aj) are chosen by players i and j, the states evolve according to the following
table, where dij denotes the change in the variable dij and the + sign a strictly positive
value:
dij 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 + + + +
dji 0 0 0 0 + + + + + + + +
ai D D C C D D C C D D C C
aj D C D C D C D C D C D C
dij 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1  1 0 1 0
dji 0 1 0 0 0 2  1 1  1 1 0 0
(1)
Let dij (hi) denote the value of dij following a history hi 2 Hi;Ni . We will often abuse
notation and dene dij (h) for a history h 2 H, where the terms not in hi enter vacuously.
Dene the interim strategy  i;Ni : Hi;Ni ! fC;Dg as
 i;Ni(hi) =
(
C if maxj2Ni dij (hi) = 0
D if maxj2Ni dij (hi) > 0
This interim strategy instructs each player i to defect if and only if at least one of his
requirednumber of defections dij is positive. The strategy  i of player i is the collection
interim strategies f i;MgMNnfig. A prole of such strategies will be denoted by N .
Note that, if dij > dji, the states return to (0; 0) after dji periods of (D;D) and dij dji
periods of (D;C). Hence, dij may be interpreted as the number of defections that players
i and j require from player i in the future to return to the initial state. The next theorem
shows that such a strategy prole satises the three properties of Section 2.3.
Theorem 1 If  = 1, the strategy prole N satises C, A-IE, and A-S.
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The proof of Theorem 1 exploits two crucial attributes of the above strategies. First,
the strategy prole N satises 
A-stability. For a crude intuition, consider Figures 1
and 2. The number next to each vertex inside the graph denotes a player, the outside
letter the actions, and the outside numbers on each edge the pair (dij; dji). Consider the
pentagon in Figure 1. A deviation of player 1 spreads along the cycle and is stopped by
the simultaneous play of D by players 3 and 4. Consider now the hexagon. Defections
stop spreading because they reach player 4 simultaneously. Note how the play of D which
originates from player 1, moves away from player 1 in both directions. That is, player
1 is a source of Ds. In the pentagon, after players 2 and 5 play D, the play of D
moves way from these players as well, that is, players 2 and 5 become sources. Our proof
strategy generalizes this observation: there always exists a source player and the set of
source players expands. Figure 2 provides additional intuition about the annihilation
of Ds that occurs when players conform to the prole N . Note that the graph has two
cycles. Consider a history of length 10 in which player 1 deviates in the rst period only,
player 2 does not respond and does play C for the rst 10 periods, and all other players
always conform to the prole N . The rst plot of Figure 2, depicts the state of play
at the beginning of period 10 when player 2 plays his nal deviation to C. By period
15, d21 = d23 and no player except player 2 plays D. Thus, defections will die out in 5
periods. Notice one additional feature of N : when the play reverts to cooperation in all
relationships, all connected players will have played the same number of Ds.
Second, the retaliatory nature of the prole N is such that, in any relationship, a play
of (D;C) is always matched by a later play of (C;D). Hence, a payo¤ of 1 + g is followed
by a payo¤ of  l. As we shall see, this is the reason why A1 and A-stability guarantee
that, after any history, conforming to the prole N yields an average payo¤ at least as
large as the average payo¤ from any deviation.
We rst establish that the strategy prole N satises 
A-stability. For any history
h 2 H, dene the excess defection in a relationship to be eij (h) = dij (h)   dji (h).
Fix an information network G and, for any history h 2 H and any path  = (j1; ::; ; jm),
dene
E(h) =
Pm 1
k=1 ejkjk+1 (h)
to be the sum of the excess defections along the path. Let Pif be the set of paths with
initial vertex i and terminal vertex f and Pii the set of cycles with initial vertex i. Finally,
let S(h) denote the set of players such that the aggregate excess defection on any path
12
Figure 1: The time period is denoted by t. The number next to a vertex inside the graph
denotes the player, the letter next to a vertex outside the graph denotes the action chosen
in period t (the letter is underlined if the player is deviating), and the outside numbers
on an edge denote the pair (dij; dji) at the beginning of the period.
Figure 2: The time period is denoted by t. The number next to a vertex inside the graph
denotes the player, the letter next to a vertex outside the graph denotes the action chosen
in period t (the letter is underlined if the player is deviating), and the outside numbers
on an edge denote the pair (dij; dji) at the beginning of the period.
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departing from them is non-positive, that is,
S(h) = fi 2 N : E(h)  0 for any  2 Pif , for any f 2 Ng
Such players can be interpreted as the sources of Ds in the network in that defections
travel away from players in S(h). The next lemma shows that aggregate excess defections
along paths depend only on the initial and terminal vertices and that S(h) is non-empty
for any history h. Let the function I () denote the indicator function.
Lemma 2 Consider an information network G. For any history (h; a) 2 H in which a
history h 2 H is followed by stage-game action prole a 2 AN :
(1) If  2 Pif
E(h; a) = E(h) + I (ai 6= af ) [I (ai = C)  I (ai = D)]
(2) If { 2 Pii
E{(h) = 0
(3) If ; 0 2 Pif
E(h) = E0(h)
(4) S(h) is non-empty.
The next result uses Lemma 2 to establish that the strategy prole N satises 
A-
stability. The main idea of the proof is that the set S (h) expands when players play
according to the strategy prole N . The intuition follows by observing that rst, when
deviations travel awayfrom a player i 2 S (h), (dij; dji), j 2 Ni, declines, and second, if
a player i is in S (h) and has a neighbor j such that (dij (h) ; dji (h)) = (0; 0), then player
j is also in S (h).
Lemma 3 The strategy prole N satises A-S.
We will use Lemmas 2 and 3 to prove Theorem 1. The intuition for the nal leg of
this result follows from the prole N being such that, in any relationship, the outcome
(D;C) is always matched by the outcome (C;D). The di¢ culty consists in evaluating
the payo¤ of sequences for which no limit exists and in which deviations occur an innite
number of times, as the one shot deviation principle is inapplicable. Too see how these
complications are resolved consider any history. The strategy N species a future play
for the remainder of the game that leads to cooperation within nite time. Moreover,
within any nite horizon, the number of periods in which a player can gain g in any
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relationship by deviating from N can be larger than the number of period in which he
will incurs  l by at most one. This follows as any deviation to defection is always met
by an immediate defection and as cooperation is restored only after the deviating player
has incurred  l. Then, as a direct consequence of A1, a player cannot strictly gain from
deviating as the time horizon grows large. Indeed, an innite number of deviations brings
the payo¤ strictly below the cooperative payo¤.
Proof of Theorem 1. The prole N trivially satises C. We will now show that, for
any history h 2 H,
Vi(hN;GjG)  Vi(i; h i;GjG)
for any interim strategy i 2 i;Ni, any G 2   (Ni), and any i 2 N . One can easily verify
that -IE then follows.
Consider any history h 2 H of length z  1. Notice that by A-S, (ii) in the denition
of Banach-Mazur limits, and linearity
Vi(hN;GjG) =
P
j2Ni ij
Hence, N is 
A-IE if and only if for any player i 2 N and for any interim strategy
i 2 i;Ni P
j2Ni ij  Vi(i; h i;GjG) for any G 2   (Ni) :
Let fatNg1t=z be the sequence of stage-game actions generated by (i; h i;G) after history
h when the information network is G. Dene h
t
, t  z   1, to be the history of length
t generated by the strategy prole (i; 
h
 i;G) after history h, that is, h
z 1
= h and, for
any t  z, ht+1 = (ht; at+1N ). Consider any relationship ij 2 G. Omitting some dependent
variables for notational convenience, dene a variable which counts how many times an
action prole (ai; aj) has been played by the pair ij between periods s and s+T in history
h
s+T
, s  z,
nsij(ai; ajjT ) =
Ps+T
t=s I
 
ati = ai

I
 
atj = aj

.
Then, from Table (1) and the denition of eij(), for any s  z,
nsij(D;Cj0)  nsij(C;Dj0) = eij(h
s 1
)  eij

h
s

which trivially implies that
nzij(D;CjT )  nzij(C;DjT ) =
PT+z
t=z
 
ntij(D;Cj0)  ntij(C;Dj0)

=
= eij(h
z 1
)  eij

h
T+z

 z(T )
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Notice that eij

h
t

< 0 implies that dji

h
t

> 0, which implies that at+1j = D, which
nally implies that eij

h
t+1

 eij

h
t

. Thus, when player j plays according to j after
history h, it must be the case that, for any T , eij

h
T+z

  1, if eij(hz 1) > 0; and
eij

h
T+z

 eij(hz 1), if eij(hz 1) < 0. Hence, for some M z > 0, z(T )  M z for every
T . It follows that the payo¤ of player i in relationship ij must satisfy
PT+z
t=z uij(a
t
i; a
t
j) = n
z
ij(C;CjT ) + (1 + g)nzij(D;CjT )  lnzij(C;DjT ) =
= nzij(C;CjT ) +
1 + g   l
2
2nzij(C;DjT ) + (1 + g)z(T )
Note that
nzij(C;CjT ) + 2nzij(C;DjT ) + nzij(D;DjT ) + z(T ) = T + 1
and that, by A1, 1 + g   l < 2. Then, since z(T ) MZ for every T ,
lim supT!1
PT+z
t=z uij(a
t
i; a
t
j)
T + 1
 1
Therefore, the Banach-Mazur limit satises

 (PT+z
t=z uij(a
t
i; a
t
j)
T + 1
)1
T=0
!
 1
The claim follows as Banach Mazur limits are linear.
Comments
Theorem 1 applies to several extensions of the baseline model. First, it is trivially
robust to uncertainty on the number of players. Second, payo¤s can be heterogeneous
and allowed to depend on each relationship as long as A1 holds in all relationships. Indeed,
Theorem 1 works even if payo¤s are private information as long as they satisfy A1 in all
possible realizations. Second, nowhere in the proof of Theorem 1 was it assumed that
ij > 0 for any ij 2 G. Indeed, the arguments hold when ij = 0 for some ij 2 G. Thus,
this result extend to the case in which the set of players observed by another player is
larger than the set of players that a¤ect this players payo¤.
We allow a pair (dij; dji) to grow unbounded to prevent Ds from cycling around the
graph. Intuitively, suppose that ij is a relationship on a cycle. If player i fails to respond
once to a play of (C;D) in relationship ij, D propagates only in one direction and enter
a cycle. To extinguishthis D, player i must play D so that D travels in the opposite
direction as well. Although the network is nite, local information prevents the players
from nding the smallest number of counterbalancingDs that prevent periodicity of
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punishments. As strategies only rely on local information, all Ds propagating in one
direction must be o¤set by the same number of Ds in the opposite direction.
4 Impatient Players
This section studies games with players having discount factors below one. The rst
subsection introduces strategies and proves some preliminary results. The strategies con-
structed here are variants of the strategy discussed in Section 3. Punishments remain
contagious and spread through the information network, but the maximal number of de-
fections expected by any neighbor is bounded. Thus, retaliations are no longer balanced
in the sense discussed in the previous section. To see why the prole N needs to be
modied when the discount factors are below one, suppose that the information network
is a large star network. Take a history of length T in which one peripheral player has
always played D and the remaining players always C. It straightforward to check that,
the longer T , the larger  must be for the central player to comply with N and that no
lower bound smaller than one exists for such .
Since retaliations are not balanced, inducing incentive compatibility runs into the
problem that defections can cycle. In particular, players may expect defections to reach
them in the future even when cooperation has resumed in each of their relationships.
Checking sequential rationality in such cases is extremely demanding. It is possible to
circumvent this di¢ culty with a rather direct approach that restricts the set of infor-
mation networks. This section shows how to extend such an approach to our general
framework. In appendix 5.1, we prove that, if priors assign positive probability only to
acyclic information networks, a simple -invariant equilibrium exists that satises C and
-stability. This result is a stepping stone for the main theorem presented here, which
establishes that, if prior beliefs have full support, the very same strategy prole satises
sequential rationality for an appropriate selection of a consistent system of beliefs. Nu-
merous robustness properties of these bounded-punishment strategies are discussed after
the main result.
4.1 Strategies and Preliminary Results
This subsection introduces the strategy prole N that di¤ers from the one in Section
3 in that the maximal number of defections expected from any player is bounded by 2.
As before, two state variables (dij; dji) characterize the state of each relationship ij 2 G
and require each player i to defect if and only if at least one of his requirednumber of
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defections dij is positive. Thus, for hi 2 Hi;Ni ,
i;Ni(hi) =
(
C if maxj2Ni dij (hi) = 0
D if maxj2Ni dij (hi) > 0
where dij (hi) is the value of dij after history hi.
The transitions for the state variables (dij; dji) di¤er from Section 3 and depend on
the sign of the payo¤ parameter l.
Case l > 0 : In the rst period, dij = 0 for any ij 2 G. Given a state (dij; dji) and
actions (ai; aj) for the relationship ij, the state in the next period is determined by
the following transition rule
dij 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 + + + +
dji 0 0 0 0 + + + + + + + +
ai D D C C D D C C D D C C
aj D C D C D C D C D C D C
dij 0 0 2 0 0 dji 0 dji  1 0 0 0
dji 0 2 0 0 0 0  1 0  1 0 0 0
where dij, as before, denotes the change in variable dij and the + sign a strictly
positive value.
Case l < 0 : In the rst period, dij = 0 for any ij 2 G. Given a state (dij; dji) and
actions (ai; aj) for the relationship ij, the state in the next period is determined by
the transition rule
dij 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 + + + +
dji 0 0 0 0 + + + + + + + +
ai D D C C D D C C D D C C
aj D C D C D C D C D C D C
dij 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2  1 2  dij 2  dij 2  dij
dji 0 1 0 0  1  1  1 2  dji  1 2  dji 2  dji 2  dji
where dij, again, denotes the change in variable dij and the + sign a strictly
positive value.
Case l = 0 : Choose either transition rule.
We denote a prole of such strategies by N .
5 To achieve incentive compatibility
5We omit the dependence on parameter l for simplicity.
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at every information set, (dij; dji) is bounded by (2; 2) in all cases. Note that, when
the stage game is the prisoners dilemma, equilibrium punishments following a deviation
from the e¢ cient play last for two periods. To see why, consider a player who needs to
punish the opponent in one relationship but to cooperate in a second relationship in which
his opponents is expected to play D. If this player delays the punishment in the rst
relationship by one period, and thus temporarily restores cooperation in the second, he
will have to defect in next period to restore cooperation in the rst. Such action will then
be a new deviation in the second relationship and thus trigger a two-period punishment.
One can easily see that if a one-period punishment was instead triggered, delaying the
punishment by one period in the rst relationship can yield a higher payo¤ in the second
when 1 + g   l > 0.
The following result is instrumental to the proof of the main theorems of this section.
It provides su¢ cient conditions for player i never to expect his neighbors to playD because
of the past play in relationships to which player i does not belong. These conditions are:
(i) all deviations have occurred in player is neighborhood; (ii) no two neighbors of player
i are connected by a path.
Given a history h 2 H of length T and a network G, let D (G; h; t) denote the set of
players who deviate from the strategy prole N in period t  T . Further, dene
D (G; h) =
T[
t=1
D (G; h; t) :
Again, let dij (h) be the value of dij following history h. A component of an undirected
graph is a maximal subgraph in which any two vertices are connected to each other by a
path. A relationship ij 2 G is a bridge in G if its deletion from G increases the number
of components.
Lemma 4 Consider a network G, a player i 2 N , and a history h 2 H such that:
(i) D (G; h)  Ni [ fig;
(ii) If j 2 D (G; h) nfig, the relationship ij is a bridge in G.
Then, djk (h) = 0 for any j 2 Ni and k 2 Njnfig.
The proof proceeds by induction. It shows that if all deviations have occurred in player is
neighborhood, and if there is no cycle that includes player i and his deviating neighbors,
then player i never expects anyone of his neighbors to defect in response to behavior
outside their relationship, regardless of his actions. Intuitively, since defections spread
outwards in the information network, they can only return to player i if there is a cycle
connecting i to a deviating player.
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4.2 Full Support
This section establishes that the strategy prole N is a -invariant equilibrium satisfying
C whenever prior beliefs have full support. Some of arguments developed here rely on the
analysis of acyclic networks which appears in appendix 4.1. Let FS be the set of prior
beliefs having full support, that is, if f 2 FS then f(G) > 0 for any G. The main idea
of the proof consists in constructing a consistent system of beliefs such that all deviations
are localand do not spread. That is, beliefs will be such that, following a deviation by
a neighbor, a player believes that this neighbor is isolated. Naturally, the assumption of
full support is crucial for this task. The perturbations of the equilibrium strategies needed
in the construction of our consistent system of beliefs are chosen to converge pointwise to
the equilibrium strategy.
Fix a player i with a neighborhood Ni. Let Gi denote the network in which Nj = fig
for any player j 2 Ni, and Nj = NnfNi[fi; jgg for any j =2 Ni[fig. That is, Gi consists
of an incomplete star network, in which player i is the center and the players in Ni are
the periphery, and a disjoint, totally connected component.6 Consider the strategy N .
Given a history hi observed by player i when is neighborhood is Ni, let h (hi) be the
history such that (Gi ; h
 (hi)) 2 I (hi) and every player j =2 Ni [ fig plays according to
N (i.e. plays C) in every period. Hence, at the node (G

i ; h
 (hi)) all deviations are local
in that they have occurred only in player is relationships. We say that player j 2 Ni
i-deviates from N at the observed history hi if
j 2 D (Gi ; h (hi))
that is, if player j does not play according to N on the path to hi when the network is
Gi .
The next lemma shows that it is possible to construct a consistent belief system such
that for any player i: (i) whenever a player j i-deviates, player i believes that player js
neighborhood contains only player i; (ii) player i believes that all deviations occur in his
relationships. This is achieved by assuming that trembles are such that a deviation by a
player with a singleton neighborhood is innitely more likely than a deviation by a player
with a larger neighborhood, and such that, as in the proof of Theorem 7, more recent
deviations are innitely more likely than less recent ones.
Lemma 5 If priors beliefs are in FS, there exists a system of beliefs  consistent with
strategy prole N such that, for any player i 2 N and observed history hi of length T ,
(a) if player j 2 Ni i-deviates, then  (G; hjhi) = 0 for any (G; h) 2 I (hi) for which G
6The particular form of the latter component is inessential.
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is such that Nj 6= fig;
(b) if (G; h) 2 I (hi) and for some t  T ,
D (G; h; t) 6= D (Gi ; h (hi) ; t) ,
then  (G; hjhi) = 0.
The proof of the main result of this subsection follows from the preceding lemma and
Lemma 4.
Theorem 6 If  is su¢ ciently close to one, the strategy prole N satises C and FS-IE.
Proof. The strategy proles clearly satisfy C. We now establish FS-IE. In particular it
will be shown that given the system of beliefs  characterized in Lemma 5, it is sequentially
rational to comply with the equilibrium strategy for any prole of prior beliefs satisfying
A3. Fix: a player i 2 N ; a history hi of length T observed by player i; and node (G; h) such
that (G; hjhi) > 0. By Lemmas 4 and 5, for j 2 Ni and k 2 Njnfig, djk(h0) = 0 for any
history h0 which has h as a subhistory and D (G; h0) nD (G; h)  fig. Any player i believes
that for any neighbor j 2 Ni, djk(h0) = 0 for any k 2 Njnfig. Consequently, player i
believes that the action of a neighbor j 2 Ni at any history h0 is solely determined dji(h0).
Thus, the verication of sequential rationality is identical to the case in which networks
are acyclic, and appears in Theorem 7 below. Property FS-IE follows immediately as
the strategies are independent of the prior beliefs.
Comments
The strategy prole of Theorem 6 is such that all players believe that defections spread
away and never return, and that cooperation is restored permanently within two periods.
This follows immediately from the above proof noting that no player expects defections to
cycle and that the number of defections expected from a player in any of his relationships
is bounded by two. Of course, such stability in beliefmay or may not be coexist with
the actual systemic robustness of a permanent reversion to cooperation within nite time.
Nevertheless, it does point out that it is possible to construct sequential equilibria in which
incentives are always perceived as local. In such equilibria, defections are reactive and
never anticipatory, that is, players do not defect in anticipation of forthcoming defections.
Several the robustness properties of the equilibrium strategy of Section 3 are satised
by the equilibrium strategy of this section provided that the ordinal properties of the
games are the same across all relationships. Uncertainty about the number of players,
heterogeneity in payo¤s, and uncertainty about payo¤s consistent with A1 can be allowed
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for without compromising the results. The equilibrium in this section is also robust to
heterogeneity in discount rates. The above theorem can also be extended to the case in
which ij = ji = 0 for some ij 2 G. This is again achieved by using the same system of
beliefs as in Theorem 6 but modifying the strategies so that dij = 0 in any relationship ij
for which ij = 0, that is, deviations in relationship ij are ignored. The intuition follows
from such deviations being irrelevant for the immediate payo¤s and not being expected
to return via a di¤erent path.
The assumption of full support can be dispensed with when l > 0 by adapting an
argument rst used by Ellison (1994).7 Note that a simple grim trigger strategy sustains
cooperation for values of  in some interval
 
; 

. Then, cooperation can be extended
to any  2  =; 1 by partitioning the game into T   1 independent games played every
T periods and by playing according to grim trigger strategies in each of the independent
games. The number T is chosen so that implied discount rate T is in
 
; 

. The
equilibrium prole, however, is not robust to heterogeneous stage-game payo¤s and, in
particular, to heterogeneous discount rates since all players must partition the repeated
game into independent games of identical length. Moreover, a player who defects in one
of the T   1 games never returns to cooperation in that game. Play eventually settles on
constant defection in the component in which this player resides. Thus, such equilibria
never satisfy -stability.
The full support assumption is helpful in establishing theorem 6, as it allows su¢ -
cient exibility in the determination of appropriate posterior beliefs. In particular, in the
proof posterior beliefs are concentrated on networks that never lead to cycles of defec-
tions in histories in which deviations were observed. In a network environment, McBride
(2006) exploits an analogous exibility in posteriors by adopting the notion of conjectural
equilibrium in Gilli (1992).
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5 Appendix
5.1 Acyclic Networks
In this subsection, we circumvent the problem of cycling defections by restricting the class
of information networks. In particular, we prove that, if priors assign positive probability
only to acyclic information networks, the prole of strategies introduced in section 4.1
is a -invariant equilibrium satisfying C and -stability. That e¢ ciency can be easily
obtained with relatively simple strategies in any acyclic network is of interest in cases
in which a planner chooses the information network as in Haag and Laguno¤ (2006).
Moreover, this result is a stepping stone for theorem 6 which establishes that, if prior
beliefs have full support, the very same strategy prole satises sequential rationality for
an appropriate selection of a consistent system of beliefs. Let NC be the set of admissible
beliefs such that if f 2 NC and f(G) > 0, then G is acyclic.
Theorem 7 If  is su¢ ciently close to one, the strategy prole N satises C, NC-IE,
and NC-S.
We rst establish that the equilibrium strategy satises NC-stability and then we prove
the general theorem.
Lemma 8 The strategy prole N satises NC-S.
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Proof. Suppose that G is a tree and consider any history. For notational simplicity,
assume that G is connected. If the players play according to the prole N , the possible
transitions are given by
if l  0
dij 0 0 0 0 0 0 +
dji 0 0 0 0 + + +
ai D D C C D C D
aj D C D C D D D
dij 0 0 2 0 0 0  1
dji 0 2 0 0 0  1  1
if l  0
dij 0 0 0 0 0 0 +
dji 0 0 0 0 + + +
ai D D C C D C D
aj D C D C D D D
dij 0 0 1 0 0 0  1
dji 0 1 0 0  1  1  1
We will prove the claim by induction on the number of players. It is easily veried that
NC-stability holds for n = 2. Suppose that n > 2. Consider a relationship ij such that
player i is the unique neighbor of player j (player j is a terminal vertex). First note that,
if dij = 0, it will remains so for the remainder of the game. Consequently, if dij = 0, the
relationship ij is superuous for the play of player i as player i plays D if and only if
dik > 0 for some neighbor k 6= j. Hence, by induction, there exists a period t such that
the play of all the players in the network in which the relationship ij is removed is C
in all periods greater than t. Obviously, the same will hold for player j for some period
t0  t. Conversely, if dij > 0, since player js only neighbor is player i, dij will become
zero after a nite number of periods and the above argument applies again.
The proof of Theorem 7 exploits NC-stability to establish that the strategy prole N
is a NC-invariant equilibrium. In the rst part of the argument, we construct consistent
beliefs such that players believe that deviations occur only in their neighborhood. This is
achieved by dening trembles for which more recent deviations to D are innitely more
likely than less recent deviations. Such beliefs imply that any player i believes that the
action of a neighbor j 2 Ni at any history h is determined exclusively by dji(h). For
example, consider the prisoners dilemma and a linear information network with three
players in which player 1 is connected to player 2 who is connected to player 3. If player
1, upon observing a defection believes that it originated with player 3 two period earlier,
he expects player 2 to defect twice. If instead he believes that the defection originated
with player 2, he expect no further defections. In our construction, consistent beliefs
correspond to the latter case. The second part of the argument is a tedious step-by-step
verication that sequential rationality holds given such a system of beliefs.
Comments
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Acyclic graph allow us to bound punishments since deviations do not cycle even if
retaliations are not balanced. Thus, we are able to obtain NC-stability. Furthermore,
at any history cooperation is restored after no more than 3n periods. All the robustness
properties of the equilibrium strategy of Section 3 are satised by the equilibrium strategy
of this section provided that the ordinal properties of the games are the same across all
relationships. Uncertainty about the number of players, heterogeneity in payo¤s, and
uncertainty about payo¤s consistent with A1 can be allowed for without compromising
the results. The equilibrium in this section is also robust to heterogeneity in discount
rates. The above theorem can be easily extended to the case in which ij = ji = 0 for
some ij 2 G. This is achieved by using the same beliefs as in Theorem 7, but modifying
the strategies so that deviations in a relationship ij for which ij = 0 are not punished,
that is, dij = 0. Such deviations are inconsequential for players i and j as they do not
a¤ect current payo¤s and never return.
Proof of Theorem 7
We begin with a preliminary lemma.
Lemma 9 If the prior beliefs are in NC, there exists a system of beliefs  consistent
with strategy prole N such that, for any history hi 2 Hi;Ni observed a player i 2 N , if
(G; hjhi) > 0 for some (G; h) 2 I(hi), then D (G; h)  Ni [ fig.
Proof. Consider trembles such that (i) a deviation to D by player i in period t when
maxj dij = 0 occurs with probability "
t
, where 1 > n 
1  ; (ii) a deviation to C by player
i in period t when maxj dij > 0 occurs with probability "2. As "! 0, any nite number
of deviations to D is innitely more likely than a single deviation to C and any nite
number of recent deviations to D is innitely more likely than one earlier deviation to
D. Given the sequence of completely mixed behavior strategy proles "N obtained by
adding these trembles to the prole N , let 
"(G; h) be the probability of node (G; h).
The strategy "N is such that, for every information set I (hi) of player i, the conditional
belief of node (G; h) 2 I (hi)
" (G; hjhi) = 
"(G; h)P
(G0;h0)2I(hi) 
"(G0; h0)
converges as "! 0, since each "(G; h) is a polynomial.
Consider an acyclic network G for which f (G) > 0 and a player i and a neighbor j 2 Ni.
Consider any history hi 2 Hi:Ni and let h+(hi) 2 H denote the unique history of play
(G; h+(hi)) 2 I(hi) in which all players, but for players in Ni [ fig comply with the
equilibrium strategy, that is, all the deviations observed by player i are attributed to js
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behavior. Let hsi denote the subhistory of hi of length s, a
s
j the action of player in period
s, and dene
Tj =

sjdji(hsi ) = 0 and asj = D
	
The probability of history h+(hi) then satises
"(G; h+(hi)) = x(")y (")
Q
j2Ni
Q
s2Tj "
s
= x(")y (") "
P
j2Ni
P
s2Tj
s
since Lemma 4 applies, for j 2 Ni, djk(h+(hi)) = 0 for any k 2 Njnfig. The term
x(") is a product that includes the prior and probabilities of non-deviations, and y (")
a product of the probabilities of deviations to C by players in Ni directly observed by
player i (dji(hsi ) > 0 and a
s
j = C). Obviously,
lim
"!0
x (") = f (G) .
Now consider any other history such that (G; h) 2 I(hi). Suppose that such a history
displays a deviation to C which is not directly observed by player i. Then, by construction
"(G; h)  y(")"2.
Thus, n 
1  < 1 implies that
lim
"!0
"(G; h)
"(G; h+(hi))
 lim
"!0
1
x (")
"
2 
P
j2Ni
P
s2Tj
s
= 0,
since P
s2Tj 
s <
P1
s=0 
s < 2.
Consider now a history h0 in which all deviations to C have been directly observed by
player i. Let t denote the rst period in which djk(h0t) > 0 for some k 2 Njni. Then,
"(G; h0)  y(")"tQj2NiQs2Tj jst "s
Now, n 
1  < 1 implies that
lim
"!0
"(G; h0)
"(G; h+(hi))
 lim
"!0
1
x (")
"
t 
P
j2Ni
P
s2Tj js>t
s
= 0
since
n
P
s2Tj js>t 
s < n
P1
s=t+1 
s < t:
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Since there are only nitely many histories in I(hi), it must be that lim"!0 " (G; hjhi) > 0
only if h = h+(hi). Therefore player i believes that D (G; h)  Ni [ fig.
We now return to the proof of the Theorem.
Proof of Theorem 7. Property C is obvious. Tables are added as supplementary
material to clarify the evolution of payo¤s within a neighborhood after a defection. To
prove NC-IE, consider the system of beliefs  as in Lemma 9. Then, for any history
hi 2 Hi;Ni observed by player i 2 N , if (G; hjhi) > 0 for some (G; h) 2 I(hi), then
D (G; h)  Ni [ fig. Thus, since any relationship ij 2 G is a bridge, the conditions of
Lemma 4 hold. Hence, for j 2 Ni and k 2 Njnfig, djk(h0) = 0 for any history h0 which
has h as a subhistory and D (G; h0) nD (G; h)  fig. Thus, any player i believes that for
any neighbor j 2 Ni, djk(h0) = 0 for any k 2 Njnfig. Consequently, player i believes that
the action of a neighbor j 2 Ni at any history h0 is solely determined by dji(h0).
In order to check sequential rationality, we need to consider two separate cases. First
assume that l  0. Given any history, seven values of (dij; dji) are possible, namely
(0; 0), (1; 0), (0; 1), (1; 1), (0; 2), (2; 0), and (2; 2). First consider the case in which
maxj2Ni dij(hi) = 0 and thus i (hi) = C. If player i is su¢ ciently patient, he prefers
to comply with the equilibrium strategy since the payo¤ di¤erences between complying
and a one shot deviation to D with any neighbor j 2 Ni are
(1 + l)
 
 + 2
  g if (dij; dji) = (0; 0)
 l + (1 + l) if (dij; dji) = (0; 1)
 l + 2(1 + l) if (dij; dji) = (0; 2)
which are positive by A1 and l  0 when  is su¢ ciently close to one.
If maxj2Ni dij(hi) = 1, then i (hi) = D. A one shot deviation to C causes the maximum
dij to remain equal to 1 in the next period for some j 2 Ni. The payo¤ di¤erences are
(1 + g) (1  ) + 3   1 + l  3    if (dij; dji) = (0; 0)
l +
 
2 + 3

(1 + l)   (1 + g + l) if (dij; dji) = (0; 1)
g +  if (dij; dji) = (1; 0)
l +  if (dij; dji) = (1; 1)
l (1  ) if (dij; dji) = (0; 2)
As  ! 1, the rst and the last expression converge to zero, while the remaining three
expressions become strictly positive. Since maxj2Ni dij(hi) = 1, a neighbor exists with
whom player i strictly loses by deviating to C when  is close to 1. Since ij > 0 for any
j 2 Ni, a deviation to C strictly decreases payo¤s for  close to 1.
Finally, suppose that max dij(hi) = 2. A one shot deviation to C causes the maximum
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dij to remain equal to 2 in the next period for some j 2 Ni. The payo¤ di¤erences are
(1 + g) (1  )   1  4  l  2   4 if (dij; dji) = (0; 0)
 (1 + g) + 3 + 4 + (1  2 + 3 + 4)l if (dij; dji) = (0; 1)
(1 + g)
 
1 +    2   1  4  l  2   4 if (dij; dji) = (1; 0)
(1 + g)
 
   2+ 4 + (1  2 + 4)l if (dij; dji) = (1; 1)
l(1  2) if (dij; dji) = (0; 2)
(1 + ) (1 + g) + 2   1 if (dij; dji) = (2; 0)
l + 2 if (dij; dji) = (2; 2)
As  ! 1 the rst and the fth expression converge to zero, while the remaining expres-
sions become strictly positive. Since maxj2Ni dij(hi) = 2, a neighbor exists with whom
player i strictly loses by deviating to C when  is close to 1. Since ij > 0 for any j 2 Ni,
a deviation to C strictly decreases payo¤s for  close to 1.
Next assume that l  0. Given any history, ve values of (dij; dji) are possible, namely
(0; 0), (1; 0), (0; 1), (1; 1), and (2; 2). First consider the case in which maxj2Ni dij(hi) = 0
and thus i (hi) = C. If player i is su¢ ciently patient, he prefers to comply with the equi-
librium strategy since the payo¤ di¤erences between complying and a one shot deviation
to D with any neighbor j 2 Ni are
 g + (1 + l)  if (dij; dji) = (0; 0)
 l if (dij; dji) = (0; 1)
As  ! 1, the rst expression is strictly positive and the second weakly positive by A1
and l  0.
If maxj2Ni dij(hi) = 1, then i (hi) = D. A one shot deviation to C causes the maximum
dij to increase to 2 in the next period for some j 2 Ni. The payo¤ di¤erences are
g   (1 + g + l)  + 2 if (dij; dji) = (0; 0)
l   g + 2 if (dij; dji) = (0; 1)
g +  + 2 if (dij; dji) = (1; 0)
l +  + 2 if (dij; dji) = (1; 1)
As  ! 1, the rst expression is weakly positive and the remaining expressions become
strictly positive, since 1 > g   l by A1. Since maxj2Ni dij(hi) = 1, a neighbor exists with
whom player i strictly loses by deviating to C when  is close to 1. Since ij > 0 for any
j 2 Ni, a deviation to C strictly decreases payo¤s for  close to 1.
Finally, suppose that max dij(hi) = 2. A one shot deviation to C causes the maximum
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dij to remain equal to 2 in the next period for some j 2 Ni. The payo¤ di¤erences are
g   (1 + g)  + 2 if (dij; dji) = (0; 0)
l(1  2) if (dij; dji) = (0; 1)
g + (1 + g)    l2 if (dij; dji) = (1; 0)
l(1  2) + (1 + g)  if (dij; dji) = (1; 1)
l + 2 if (dij; dji) = (2; 2)
As  ! 1, the rst and the second expression converge to zero, while the remaining
expressions become strictly positive. Since maxj2Ni dij(hi) = 2, a neighbor exists with
whom player i strictly loses by deviating to C when  is close to 1. Since ij > 0 for any
j 2 Ni, a deviation to C strictly decreases payo¤s for  close to 1.
Since the incentives to conform to N are not a¤ected by the beliefs about the graph, the
proof is complete.
Supplementary Notes
The following tables clarify the incentive constraints in the proof of theorem 7. Each entry
shows the payo¤ in periods following either no deviation or a one shot deviation by player i
from the strategy i when the relationship with player j was in state (dij; dji). Payo¤s are
omitted after a relationship returns to the state (0; 0). If l  0 and maxj2Ni dij(hi) = 0:
Equilibrium: C Deviation: D
(dij; dji)
(0; 0)
(0; 1)
(0; 2)
t t+ 1 t+ 2
1 1 1
 l 1 1
 l  l 1
t t+ 1 t+ 2
1 + g  l  l
0  l 1
0  l  l
If l  0 and maxj2Ni dij(hi) = 1:
Equilibrium: D Deviation: C
(dij; dji)
(0; 0)
(0; 1)
(1; 0)
(1; 1)
(0; 2)
t t+ 1 t+ 2 t+ 3
1 + g  l  l 1
0  l 1 1
1 + g 1 1 1
0 1 1 1
0  l  l 1
t t+ 1 t+ 2 t+ 3
1 1 + g  l  l
 l 1 + g  l  l
1 0 1 1
 l 0 1 1
 l 0  l 1
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If l  0 and maxj2Ni dij(hi) = 2:
Equilibrium: D Deviation: C
(dij; dji)
(0; 0)
(0; 1)
(1; 0)
(1; 1)
(0; 2)
(2; 0)
(2; 2)
t t+ 1 t+ 2 t+ 3 t+ 4
1 + g 0  l  l 1
0 0  l 1 1
1 + g 1 + g  l  l 1
0 1 + g  l  l 1
0 0  l  l 1
1 + g 1 + g 1 1 1
0 0 1 1 1
t t+ 1 t+ 2 t+ 3 t+ 4
1 1 + g 0  l  l
 l 1 + g 0  l  l
1 0 1 + g  l  l
 l 0 1 + g  l  l
 l 0 0  l 1
1 0 0 1 1
 l 0 0 1 1
If l  0 and maxj2Ni dij(hi) = 0:
Equilibrium: C Deviation: D
(dij; dji)
(0; 0)
(0; 1)
t t+ 1 t+ 2
1 1 1
 l 1 1
t t+ 1 t+ 2
1 + g  l 1
0 1 1
If l  0 and maxj2Ni dij(hi) = 1:
Equilibrium: D Deviation: C
(dij; dji)
(0; 0)
(0; 1)
(1; 0)
(1; 1)
t t+ 1 t+ 2 t+ 3
1 + g  l 1 1
0 1 1 1
1 + g 1 1 1
0 1 1 1
t t+ 1 t+ 2 t+ 3
1 1 + g 0 1
 l 1 + g 0 1
1 0 0 1
 l 0 0 1
If l  0 and maxj2Ni dij(hi) = 2:
Equilibrium: D Deviation: C
(dij; dji)
(0; 0)
(0; 1)
(1; 0)
(1; 1)
(2; 2)
t t+ 1 t+ 2 t+ 3
1 + g 0 1 1
0 1 + g  l 1
1 + g 1 + g  l 1
0 1 + g  l 1
0 0 1 1
t t+ 1 t+ 2 t+ 3
1 1 + g 0 1
 l 1 + g 0 1
1 0 0 1
 l 0 0 1
 l 0 0 1
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5.2 Omitted Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2. The proof rst establishes (1) and then proceeds by induction to
prove (2) and (3). Consider a history (h; a). Notice that, by denition,
eij (h; a) = eij (h) + I (ai 6= aj) [I (ai = C)  I (ai = D)]
Hence, for any path  = (j1; ::; ; jm) 2 Pif :
E(h; a) = E(h) +
m 1X
k=1
I
 
ajk 6= ajk+1

[I (ajk = C)  I (ajk = D)] =
= E(h) + I (ai 6= af ) [I (ai = C)  I (ai = D)]
The last equality holds by a simple counting argument. Consider the sequence of action
pairs f ajk ; ajk+1gm 1k=1 . First remove all the pairs of actions  ajk ; ajk+1 for which ajk =
ajk+1 since I
 
ajk 6= ajk+1

= 0. Since the stage game has only two actions, if the actions
played at the beginning and at the end of the path coincide (ai = af), we are left an even
number of alternating pairs. If actions played at the beginning and at the end do not
coincide (ai 6= af), we are left an odd number of alternating pairs. The desired equality
then follows. Figure 3 below presents a visual intuition for the claim.
Figure 3: Changes in excess defections are reported on any given link for a particular
action prole chosen by the players on a path.
Notice that (1) and a simple induction argument imply (2). When h is empty, (2) holds
trivially. If (2) holds for any history h, it will also hold for a history (h; a) since ai = af
in a cycle. A similar induction argument also establishes (3).
Claim (4) is also proved by induction. When h is the empty history, dij (h) = 0 for any
ij 2 G, and (4) holds trivially since S(h) = N . Suppose that (4) holds for a history h.
Consider the history h0 = (h; a) and a player i 2 S(h). If i 2 S(h0), the claim holds.
Suppose then that i =2 S(h0). Since i 2 S(h), by (1) there exists at least one path  2 Pij
such that E(h0) = 1. We will show that this implies that j 2 S(h0). Consider any path
0 2 Pjf and any path 00 2 Pif for any f 2 N . Note that, by (1), E00(h0)  1 and, by
(3):
E0(h
0) = E00(h0)  E(h0) =
= E00(h
0)  1  E00(h)  0
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which establishes (4).
Proof of Lemma 3. Fix an information network G. Consider any history h 2 H of
length t. Following any history, the playersactions for the remainder of the game are
determined by N . Thus, in any relationship ij 2 G, the state transitions take place
according to the following table:
dij 0 0 0 0 0 0 +
dji 0 0 0 0 + + +
ai D D C C D C D
aj D C D C D D D
dij 0 0 1 0 0 0  1
dji 0 1 0 0 0  1  1
(2)
Let
T (h) = maxij2G fmin fdij(h); dji(h)gg :
and hs+ denote the history s periods longer than h that is generated by N after history h.
If all players play according to N after history h, for any z > T (h) all the relationships ij
will satisfy min

dij(h
z
+); dji(h
z
+)
	
= 0, that is, either dij(hz+) or dji(h
z
+) is equal to zero.
To show that the strategy satises A-stability, it will be su¢ cient to prove that, for any
history h 2 H and for any z > T (h),
(A) S(hz+)  S(hz+1+ )
(B) If S(hz+) 6= N , S(hz+) 6= S(hz+k+ ) for some k > 0
Indeed, if both statements were to hold, A-S would follow trivially as S(hz+) = N for z
su¢ ciently large, and S(hz+) = N if and only if maxij2G

dij(h
z
+)
	
= 0. We establish (A)
by contradiction. Consider a player i such that i 2 S(hz+) for z > T (h) and i =2 S(hz+1+ ).
Then, there exists a path  2 Pif such that
E(h
z
+) = 0 and E(h
z+1
+ ) = 1
Since i 2 S(hz+), by (1) of Lemma 2, f
 
hz+

= D. For player f to choose D along the
equilibrium path it must be that dfk(hz+) > 0 for some k 2 Nf . Since z > T (h), by
denition it must be that dkf (hz+) = 0 and thus, for 
0 2 Pik,
E0(h
z
+) = E(h
z
+) + efk(h
z
+) = efk(h
z
+) > 0
which contradicts that i 2 S(hz+). Hence, (A) must hold.
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For the proof of (B), take j 2 Ni such that i 2 S(hz+) and j =2 S(hz+) for z > T (h).
Notice that such player i must exist by (4) of Lemma 2. By (A), dij(hz+z
0
+ ) = 0 for any
z0  0. Since
dji(h
z+z0+1
+ ) = max
n
dji(h
z+z0
+ )  1; 0
o
for any z0  0, it follows that dji(hz+z0+ ) = 0 for any z0 > dji(hz+). The claim follows noting
that, for any history h, if eij (h) = 0 and i 2 S(h), then j 2 S(h).
Proof of Lemma 4. First consider any player j 2 D (G; h) such that j 6= i. Let
(N(Gj); Gj) denote the component of the graph Gn fijg to which player j belongs. By
condition (ii), such component cannot include player i and players in Nin fjg, or else
relationship ij would not be a bridge. We want to establish that djk(h) = 0 for k 2 Nj,
where k 6= i. Partition players in the N(Gj) based on their distance from j. In particular,
let N zj denote the set of players in N(Gj) whose shortest path to player j contains z
relationships and let N0j = fjg. Clearly, N1j = Njn fig.
By induction on the history length, we will rst prove that, if D (G; h)\N(Gj) = fjg,
then for any distance z  0, any player r 2 N zj , and any relationship rk 2 Gj:
drk(h) =
(
0 if k 2 NrnN z 1j
bz(h) if k 2 N z 1j
(3)
where the second condition holds only for z > 0 and bz(h) depends only on z and h, and
is independent of the identity of the two players. Observe that the claim holds the empty
history, as drk(;) = 0 for any rk 2 Gj. Further observe that for m 2 N zj and z > 0,
Nm  N z 1j [N zj [N z+1j and Nm \N z 1j 6= ;. Now assume that the claim holds for any
history of length up to T . We will show that it holds for length T + 1. Let (hT ; a) denote
a history of length T + 1, where a denotes the prole of actions chosen in period T + 1.
Observe that, for any distance z > 0 and any player r 2 N zj ,
ar = D , drk(hT ) > 0 for k 2 N z 1j (4)
since r =2 D  G; hT  and since, by the induction hypothesis, drk(hT ) = 0 for any k 2
NrnN z 1j . Thus, for any z > 0, all players in N zj must choose the same action since
drk(h
T ) = bz(h
T ) for any r 2 N zi and k 2 N z 1j \Nr, and since N z 1j \Nr 6= ; given that
a path exists connecting player r to player j (r belongs to component Gj). Thus, for any
distance z > 0, any player r 2 N zj , and any relationship rk 2 Gj,
drk(h
T ; a) = 0 if k 2 N zi
since drk(hT ) = dkr(hT ) = 0, and since ar = ak. Similarly, observe that for any distance
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z  0, any player r 2 N zj , and any relationship rk 2 G,
drk(h
T ; a) = 0 if k 2 N z+1j
since drk(hT ) = 0 if k 2 N z+1j , and because (4) immediately implies that drk(hT ; a) = 0,
by the transition rules. Finally note that for any distance z > 0, any player r 2 N zj , and
any relationship rk 2 G,
drk(h
T ; a) = bz(h
T ; a) if k 2 N z 1j
since drk(hT ) = bz(hT ) if k 2 N z 1j , and because al = am for any two players l;m 2 N sj
for any s  0. Thus, condition (3), must hold for a history of arbitrary length in which
only player j has deviated in component Gj. This establishes that for any history h 2 H,
if conditions (i) and (ii) in the lemma hold, djk (h) = 0, for any j 2 D (G; h) nfig and any
one of his neighbors k 2 Njnfig.
To conclude the proof consider the neighbors of player i in NinD (G; h). In partic-
ular, consider the component of the network G to which player i belongs when all the
relationships between player i and players in D (G; h) have been removed from the net-
work G. Label such network (N(Gi); Gi). Clearly, NinD (G; h)  N(Gi). Furthermore,
N(Gi) \ D (G; h) = fig by construction. Hence, since by condition (ii) in the lemma
N(Gi) \ Gj = ; for any j 2 D (G; h) nfig, the previous induction argument can still be
used to establish that for any distance z  0, any player r 2 N zi , and any relationship
rk 2 Gi,
drk(h) =
(
0 if k 2 NrnN z 1i
bz(h) if k 2 N z 1i
where N zi denotes the set of player at distance z  0 from i in Gi, as in the previous part
of the proof. Therefore, djk (h) = 0, for any j 2 NinD (G; h) and any one of his neighbors
k 2 Njnfig, which with the previous part of the argument establishes the result.
Proof of Lemma 5
We begin with a preliminary result. For any history h 2 H, let ht denote the sub-history
of length t < T . The next lemma relates the sets of defecting players D (Gi ; h (hi) ; t)
and D (G; h; t) for two nodes (Gi ; h (hi)) ; (G; h) 2 I (hi).
Lemma 10 Consider a node (G; h) 2 I (hi) where history h is of length T . If
(i) D (Gi ; h (hi) ; t) = D (G; h; t) for any t < T , and
(ii) Nj = fig for any j 2 D
 
G; hT 1
 nfig,
then D (Gi ; h (hi) ; T )  D (G; h; T ).
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Proof. Suppose that the (i) and (ii) hold. Observe that by denition of h (hi),
D (Gi ; h (hi) ; t)  Ni [ fig.
Moreover, note that Lemma 4 can be applied to establish that for any sub-history ht of
length t < T and for any player j 2 Ni,
djk
 
ht

= 0 for k 2 Njnfig.
Now observe that, since (Gi ; h
 (hi)) ; (G; h) 2 I (hi), we must have that for any sub-
history ht of length t < T and for any player j 2 Ni,
dji
 
ht

= dji
 
h (hi)
t and dij  ht = dij  h (hi)t .
The latter observation immediately implies that if i 2 D (Gi ; h (hi) ; T ), then i 2 D (G; h; T ).
Now consider a player j 2 D (Gi ; h (hi) ; T ) nfig. If player j playsC at T , then dji

h (hi)
T 1

>
0, and thus j 2 D (G; h; T ) since dji
 
hT 1

> 0 as well. If player j plays D at T , then
dji

h (hi)
T 1

= 0, and thus j 2 D (G; h; T ) since djk
 
hT 1

= 0 for k 2 Nj.
We now return to the proof of Lemma 5.
Proof of Lemma 5. For any player i, consider trembles such that:
(i) If ni = 1, a deviation in period t from N occurs with probability "
t, where 
1 n < 1
(ii) If ni > 1, a deviation in period t from N occurs with probability "
2.
Note that, for any t > 1, such trembles imply that, as " vanishes, a single deviation of
type (i) at time t < T is innitely less likely than deviations of type (i) by all the players
in periods t + 1; t + 2; :::; T since t > n
P1
s=t+1 
s. Given the sequence of completely
mixed behavior strategy proles "N obtained by adding the above trembles to the prole
N , let 
"(G; h) be the probability of node (G; h). The strategy "N is such that, for every
information set I (hi) of player i, the conditional belief of node (G; h) 2 I (hi)
" (G; hjhi) = 
"(G; h)P
(G0;h0)2I(hi) 
"(G0; h0)
converges as "! 0, since each "(G; h) is a polynomial of the form
x
QW
k=1 (1  "yk)
QV
k=1 "
zk , (5)
for some parameters W;V  nT , x 2 (0; 1), and yk; zk 2 R+ for k in the appropriate
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range. For any node (G; h) 2 I (hi) dene
 (G; hjhi) = lim"!0 " (G; hjhi) .
We rst establish (a). Consider (G; h) 2 I (hi). Recall that the history h (hi) is such that
(Gi ; h
 (hi)) 2 I (hi) and every player j =2 Ni [ fig, plays C in every period. Obviously,
for any j 2 Ni,
hi (j) = h
 (hi; j) = h (j)
where hi (j), h (hi; j), and h (j) denote player js play in histories hi, h (hi), and h.
Now consider a player j 2 Ni that i-deviates from N at the observed history hi. That
is, j 2 D (Gi ; h (hi)). Since at node (Gi ; h (hi)) all deviations are of type (i),
" (Gi ; h
 (hi))  f (Gi ) (1  ")nT ",
where the lower bound is obtained by setting W to be equal to nT , yk = 1 in (5) and
noting that PV
k=1 zk 
PT
t=1 n
t < 1
since 
1 n < 1. Thus, for " su¢ ciently close to zero, there exists a constant q > 0 such
that
" (Gi ; h
 (hi))  q":
The constant q is positive since, by hypothesis, f (Gi ) > 0.
Now consider a node (G0; h0) 2 I (hi) such that N 0j 6= fig, where N 0j is neighborhood
of player j in G0. Consider two separate cases:
1. First suppose that j 2 D (G0; h0). As the deviation of player j at period t is of type
(ii), " (G0; h0)  "2. Thus,
" (G0; h0jhi)  
"(G0; h0)
"(Gi ; h (hi))
 "
q
which implies that  (G0; h0jhi) = 0. Thus, the claim holds.
2. Then suppose that j =2 D (G0; h0). Let t denote the earliest period t in which
D (Gi ; h (hi) ; t) 6= D (G0; h0; t) .
By the previous argument, we can assume that if r 2 D (G0; h0)\Ni, then N 0r = fig,
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as otherwise the node would have a null probability. Lemma 10 then yields
D (Gi ; h (hi) ; t)  D (G0; h0; t) ,
which implies that
D (Gi ; h (hi) ; t)  D (G0; h0; t) .
For any t  T , let K (t) denote the number of player in D (G0; h0; t). Then
" (G0; h0)  "
Pt
t=1K(t)
t
" (Gi ; h
 (hi))  f (Gi ) (1  ")nT " (1 n

1 )t

+
Pt
t=1K(t)
t
where the upper-bound in the rst inequality is obtained setting yk = 1, k =
1; :::;W , and x = 1 in (5), and the lower-bound in the second inequality is obtained
by setting W = nT and yk = 1 in (5), and noting thatPV
k=1 zk 
Pt 1
t=1 K (t)
t + (K (t)  1)t +P1t=t+1 nt
Hence, for some constant q0 > 0, when " is close to zero,
" (Gi ; h
 (hi))  q0" (1 n 1 )t

+
Pt 1
t=1 K(t)
t
Then
" (G0; h0jhi)  
"(G0; h0)
"(Gi ; h (hi))
 "
(1 n 1 )t

q0
and thus,  (G0; h0jhi) = 0 since 1 n < 1.
This establishes part (a) and implies that, if  (G; hjhi) > 0, player i believes that
D (G; h)  Ni [ fig.
To prove (b), observe that (a) implies that we can restrict attention to networks G
such that Nj = fig for any j 2 D (Gi ; h (hi)) nfig. We prove the claim by contradiction.
Let t be the earliest period t such that
D (Gi ; h (hi) ; t) 6= D (G; h; t) .
Observe that the same argument as in (a) shows that
D (Gi ; h (hi) ; t)  D (G; h; t)
and the claim is proved analogously.
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